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THE TRAGEDY OF STRAGEDY*
by Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Mark Thompson,
and Norman Glass
Norman Glass: We intend today to make an introductory description
of one important area of systems analysis. That area is game
theory.
Mark Thompson: Many people believe that game theory is an analytic
activity designed to figure out how best to beat your girlfriend
at chess, at backgammon, at go, or at rummy.
N.G.: But they are wrong; game theory is much more. To be sure,
an initial success of game theory was development of a strategy
which showed how poker should be played. But game theory is
important also in analysing a wide variety of situations in-
volving confrontation and cooperation. These include politics,
economics, management, warfare and diplomacy.
M.T.: We shall now present a small number of sketches designed
to illustrate important concepts in game theory.
N.G.: Perhaps the simplest game of all is one you may have
played as children.
* This working paper is introduced as a draft for one teaching
tool in a series to be developed by IIASA. The skits it comprises
were first worked out and given by Ponssard and Thompson in the
spring of 1974. Inspite of popular demand, Glass and Thompson gave
a rerun of the performance in the spring of 1975. The version
given by Glass and Thompson is here transcribed.
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M.T.: Suppose that we each cover coins on our wrists. Simul-
taneously, we uncover our coins.
N.G.: If the coins match--either both heads or both tails--
then I win Mark's coin.
M.T.: If they do not match, then I win Norman's coin.
N.G.: Why don't we play?
(They play twice. The winner of each game happily pockets the
coin of the other; the loser looks very unhappy.)
M.T.: My objective is to turn up the coins to the opposite
side of Norman's.
N.G.: My objective is to turn up the coins to match Mark's.
M.T.: Because these objectives are mutually contradictory,
there is no simple strategy that would be successful for either
one of us.
N.G.: Suppose, for instance, that I have a wonderful rule which
tells me what to do. Maybe I should examine carefully the record
of the last ten times we played and calculate what to do.
(He thinks hard and sets his coin.)
M.T.: Now if there were such a rule which would tell Norman
exactly how to set his coin, all I would have to do is follow
exactly the same rule completely to the end of Norman's thought
process and then turn up my coin the opposite to the side Norman
would turn up his.
(Thompson does this, wins the game, and takes Norman's coin.)
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N.G.: The problem of this game is to guess what the opponent
is thinking.
M.T.: For instance, I might think that Norman thinks that I
will do one thing. But if I think that he thinks that, then
I should do the opposite. In this case, I win.
N.G.: On the other hand, if I think that Mark thinks that I
will think that, then I can fool him by thinking the opposite.
In this case, I win.
M.T.: The point of this is simple: the person who can better
guess the mind of the other will win.
N.G.: But if you are afraid that your opponent can guess your
mind better than you can read his mind, then there is only one
way to make sure that you are winning your fair share of the
time.
M.T.: I think I see. I must know that he is thinking that I am
thinking that he is thinking that I am thinking that he is
thinking and .
N.G.: Wrong. The only way is to randomize. If I flip a coin
to decide how to lay it on my wrist, I will always win my fair
share of the time.
M.T.: This is called randomization of strategy. In a game such
as this, the better guesser may try to anticipate how his op-
ponent will play. If however, the opponent is the better guesser,
then the safest strategy is randomization.
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N.G.: The technical term for this situation is a zero-sum game.
This name comes from the fact that whatever Mark wins, I lose
and vice-versa.
M.T.: This can be seen in diagrammatic form on Diagram 1.
Charts of this nature are the identifying badge of game theorists.
If you happen to see anyone at IIASA studying such charts, the
chances are that he is a game theorist. Now we see on the upper
left-hand corner Norman's perspective of the game. If Norman
himself plays heads and I play heads, then Norman gains
unit. If Norman plays heads and I play tails, we see in the
corner at the lower left-hand of the box that Norman loses one
coin. My view, we see, is exactly the opposite--the nega-
tive--of Norman's view. When both players play heads, for in-
stance, I get a minus one which is the negative of Norman's
reward of plus one for this game.
N.G.: Game theorists define the value of the game as the average
results if both players play optimally. In this case, optimal
randomized play by both players makes each player equally likely
to win. The value of this game is therefore zero.
M.T.: Although the coin-flipping game is extremely simple, the
structure of this game can be seen in other situations.
N.G.: For instance, a situation that may occur in real life
is the following which is depicted in Diagram 2. It happens
that Mark has lent me 2000 schillings and I am about to leave
IIASA to return to my work in London.
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Diagram 1. The Simplest Game.
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M.T.: I know that Norman is leaving town today. I know also
that he will leave either by train or by plane. Unfortunately,
both the train and the plane leave at the same time this evening.
My problem is to go either to the airport or to the train station
and hope to find Norman. If I find him, I will get the 2000
schillings which he owes me.
N.G.: You may be able to see that the structure of this game is
exactly the same as the game with the coin flipping. Mark is
trying to match me: to go to whichever place I am leaving from.
I am trying to do exactly the opposite by avoiding him. What then
is the optimal strategy for this game?
M.T.: According to that what we said earlier, I should try to
guess where you are going to go. If I think that I have more
than half a chance to guess where you are going, then I should
simply go where I think you are going.
N.G.: My strategy is the inverse. If I think that I have better
than half a chance to guess where you are going, then I should
guess and go to the other place--either the train station or the
airport.
M.T.: But if I think that you can figure out my thinking better
than I can figure out yours, then I should flip a coin to decide
where to go.
N.G.: Right. Flipping a coin is the only way that either one
of us can be certain of having half a chance of winning the game.
\
\
\
\
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Diagram 2.
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M.T.: I think I see. The only way I can assure myself half a
chance of catching you is by flipping a coin to decide whether
to go to the airport or to the train station.
N.G.: Exactly. Now, what is the value of the game?
M.T.: If we both play optimally, I will have a one half chance
of catching you and getting from you the 2000 schillings which
you owe me. Therefore the value of the game is half of the
2000 schillings, or 3000 schillings.
N.G.: Surprisingly enough, you are right.
M.T.: Thanks a lot.
N.G.: Don't mention it. Now why is this a zero-sum game?
M.T.: Because what I win, you lose and vice-versa.
N.G.: You are doing so well that we can move on to the next
game situation which took place when you and I were operating
filling stations a few years ago. Perhaps you can explain the
situation.
M.T.: Well, each of us had a filling station across the road
from the other. The problem was whether or not we should each
day set the high price for gasoline or set the low price. If we
set the high price for gasoline, we would make a profit of 5
schillings per car.
N.G.: And when we sell gasoline for the lower price we make
a profit of 3 schillings per car.
-9-
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M.T.: A daily average of 2000 cars came by the road looking for
gasoline. The problem was to make the highest possible daily
profit.
N.G.: That's right. We also had to specify simultaneously at
midnight whether for the next day we would charge the high price
or the low price for our gasoline.
M.T.: If we both charge the high price or if we both charge the
low price, then each of us would end up with 1000 cars for the
day. At the high price, that would be 5000 schillings which we
show here on Diagram 3. If we both charge the low price, we
each get 3000 schillings which we see in the lower right hand
corner of Diagram 3.
N.G.: But, if one of us is charging the low price and the other
one is charging the high price, all the cars will go to the
station charging the low price.
M.T.: That is right. In that case, that person will make
6000 schillings that day. His competitor will not make any
money at all since no car will come to pay the higher price.
N.G.: I think it is very easy for me to discover the optimal
strategy in this game.
M.T.: Really? What is the optimal strategy?
N.G.: Well, look. Here I am at station a-minus. I must choose
between charging the high price or charging the low price. Let me
assume first that you charge the high price. Now if I also charge
the high price, we share the cars and I get 5000 schillings for the
-11-
day. But if I charge the low price, then I get all the cars.
You didn't get any of the cars and I get 6000 schillings for the
day.
M.T.: So in this case, you do better to charge the low price.
N.G.: That is right. Now suppose that you charge the low
price. If I also charge the low price, I get 3000 schillings
otherwise, I get nothing. Whether you charge the high price or
whether you charge the low price, I always do better myself to
charge the low price. Therefore I am going to charge the low
price. Pretty smart, huh?
M.T.: (Looking at the audience)
Now isn't this ridiculous? Suppose I were to follow the same
train of thought that Norman has just followed. You can see
that the game is exactly symmetric, so that if I were to follow
his process of deduction, I would end up also setting the low
price. Just look at the result. If we both charge the low
price, we'll both get 3000 schillings each day. If we were to
play the game only once, then he would be right. In the long
run, however, this is clearly stupid. If Norman was just a little
bit smarter, he would see that we would do much better by both
charging the high price, each getting 5000 schillings each day,
rather than both setting the low price. Somehow I will have to
get this through his thick skull.
N.G.: I suppose the only way we are ever going to resolve this
argument is by playing the game. Shall we play?
M.T.: By all means.
N • G. :
Play 1:
(Gloating)
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NG {PlayS low }
gets 6000 AS
MT {PlayS high}
gets a
You see I got 6000 shillings, he got nothing.
M.T.: I took a loss this time, but in the longer run I know it
is best for both of us to play high. I will play high one more
time to see if I can show him the logic that we both should play
high.
Play 2: NG ｾｰｬ｡ｹｳ low }\ gets 6000 AS MT {PlayS high}gets 0
N.G.: You 5ee, here I go, winning again. This game is just too
easy for a wizard like me.
M.T.: It is not much fun to playa game like this with selfish
people who are unable to think of the larger picture. Let us play
aga.in.
Play 3: NG {Pla.yS low }gets 3000 AS MT {PlayS low }gets 3000 AS
N.G.: Huh? He played low this time. I only got 3000 schillings
instead of 6000 schillings. Still, it's Much better than if I
had played high, I'm still ahead.
M.T.: Okay, I got my 3000 shillings, I'm not interested in the
single plays of the game, I'm interested in the long-run best
solution. Next time I'll play high to see if I can persuade
him to play high. Let us play again.
Play 4: NG 6 plays low }
, ｾ gets 6000 AS MT {PlayS high}gets 0
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N. G. : You see, once again, I win the money. I think I have this
game completely mastered.
M. T. : He still hasn't learned. This may take some time. Let us
play again.
Play 5: NG {PlayS low }gets 3000 AS MT {PlayS low }gets 3000 AS
N. G. : Now, he played low again. Still, 3000 schillings is
better than nothing. I still think my analysis of the game was
rather brilliant. Right?
M. T. : This may take a while but I think eventually we'll see
that my strategy is better than his strategy. Let us play again.
Play 6: NG {PlayS low }gets 6000 AS MT {PlayS high}gets 0
N.G.: Aha. Another 6000 schillings, this isn't bad at all.
M.T.: Eventually he will learn. Let us play again.
Play 7: NG {PlayS low }gets 3000 AS MT {PlayS 1m", }gets 3000 AS
N. G. : Hm, he played low again. I think I'm beginning to see
a pattern emerge:
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The last few games, ever since the first, my reward has been
6, 3, 6, 3, 6, 3. He seems to be planning to continue this
strategy trying to persuade me to play high. Let me analyze
this. When I'm getting 6, 3, 6, 3, 6, 3; as an average I receive
4 1/2. If I agreed with his strategy and decided to play high,
then I would get five every time. Since 5 is higher than 4 1/2,
I think that I will decide to play high.
M.T.: So finally we achieve the best outcome. Let us play.
Play 8: NG {PlayS high }gets 5000 AS MT {PlayS high }gets 5000 AS
M.T.: This then is the long-term stable solution of the game.
It may take a shorter or a longer amount .of time to arrive at
the stable best solution-depending upon the intelligence of the
person operating the other gas station.
N.G.: One thing you should notice here is that this situation
is similar to price fixing in many industries that are regulated
by anti-trust laws. Anti-trust laws usually have the provision
that two or more companies may not talk directly to each other
in setting prices.
M.T.: That is right. But the problem in this situation we can
easily see. It was not necessary for us to talk to each other.
All the communication that we needed to signal to one another
could be completely transmitted by the prices that we charged
each day.
N.G.: That is right. That is probably why anti-trust laws are
not very successful in preventing the consumer from being
conspired against by large companies. We see also why this is
a non-zero-sum game.
low, we both gain.
not in the game.
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When both of us play high instead of both
The only_ loser is the consumer and he is
M.T.: I fear that what you say is true.
N.G.: Well, I'm sorry to say what happened next.
M.T.: Me too.
N.G.: We agreed to have a special meeting to see if we could
raise the price even higher.
M.T.: Unfortunately, we were caught as we met secretly trying
to raise the price of gasoline still higher and as a result you
see us now in our next game's situation which is shown in
Diagram 4. Could you explain this, Norman?
N.G.: As the most cruel punishment of all, they have put us
in a very special prison with no other prisoners but us two.
M.T.: What is special about this prison?
N.G.: We have been able to show this by reconstructing the
prison in this room today. You see here, we have a button
which opens the only door to the prison. It is the door over
there. (Indicates a door.) Unfortunately, the button operates
the door only briefly so that, when one of us pushes the button
and then tries to run to the door, the door is shut before he
can reach it.
M.T.: The structure of this game is shown in the table at the
bottom of the diagram. The person who pushes the button for the
-16-
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other to go free remains in jail. If neither of us pushes the
button, then we both remain in jail. In this case I see a clear
solution to the game.
N.G.: What is that?
M.T.: It is obvious that you should push the button and that
I should go forward to freedom.
N.G.: That solution is not so clear to me.
M.T.: What could you possibly mean?
N.G.: It seems to me that the better solution is for you to
push the button and for me to go to freedom.
M.T.: I think that you will find that, when you use completely
objective analysis, the solution you propose is a purely selfish
one. It is a suboptimal analysis.
N.G.: I could say the same thing about your analysis.
M.T.: Please don't. I can see that we are not going to get
anywhere at this rate. Fortunately for us, I am a student of
game theory.
N.G.: Why is that fortunate?
M.T.: Well, I have devised the perfect solution that will give
each of us a one half chance of escaping to freedom.
N.G.: This isn't another of those randomized strategies, is it?
M.T.: Exactly right. What we must do is form a contract by
which we are agree to flip a coin. The person who wins the coin
-18-
flip gets to leave the prison, the person who loses the coin
flip will push the button for the other to leave. Does that
make sense?
N.G.: That makes a lot of sense. It gives each of us half a
chance to leave. That's better than spending the rest of my
life with you. Let's do it.
(They flip the coin, and Glass wins.)
N.G.: Aha, tails it is. Here I go. I can hardly wait. Just,
ah, you know, wait till I get to the door, then push the button.
(Thompson is looking rather unhappy, Glass gets to the door.)
N.G.: Okay, any time, Mark, any time, open the door.
M.T.: Hm, ha, eh, what are you doing, Norman?
N.G.: Mark, push the button please. Just push the button.
M.T.: Take your time now, we have lots of time. You especially
have lots of time. You are going free.
N.G.: Mark, could you please push the button now? I am ready.
M.T.: Hm, Norman, could I ask you one question?
N.G.: What is that?
M.T.: What is in it for me to push the button for you to go
to freedom?
N.G.: It's not a question of what's in it for you. We made an
agreement and you will now push the button for me so that I can
go to freedom. What was in it for you was you had half a chance
of my pushing the button for you.
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M.T.: Yes, that was what was in it for me, that was a very good
agreement until we flipped the coin. But now I don't see any
reason for me to push the button for you to go to freedom.
N.G.: I'm sorry Mark, we made an agreement, we must honor our
agreement. It's up to you to push the button now.
M.T.: I don't think it was a very good agreement. Why don't
we do it again and if you win next time, I promise, really truly,
to push the button for you.
N.G.: I don't think that's a very good idea.
M.T.: Well then, I'm not going to push the button.
N.G.: Do you know what we have discovered?
M.T.: What is that?
N.G.: We have here the situation of the unenforeable agreement.
M.T.: I see, the agreement itself is attractive. It is much
better than staying in prison with each other, if it could only
be enforced. The only problem is that, once we decide how the
agreement is to be fulfilled, it is not in the interest of one
of us to fulfill it.
N.G.: That's exactly right. That is why this is an unenforceable
agreement.
M.T.: So, as you can see, the situation looks very different de-
pending on whether or not we can make enforceable agreements. Thatis
why game theorists specify in the rules if their games are cooperative
or non-cooperative. Now, since we play this game non-coopera-
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tively (no agreements are enforceable among outlaws), we will both
stay in prison.
N.G.: That is true. Fortunately/however, on a special occasion
in the nation--the birthday of Professor Afifi--a general amnesty
was declared and we both were released from prison.
M.T.: And where did they send us for rehabilitation?
N.G.: Why, where else but the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria.
M.T.: Ah, yes, I remember, it did not take us long at all to
learn the ways of the natives.
N.G.: That is right.
M.T.: You see, I had a very good situation worked out at Laxen-
burg. There was this very nice lady who understood my charms,
understood my wit, and her name was Mrs. Norman Glass. Why
there she is now. Hello, Mrs. Glass. Did we not have a wonder-
ful situation?
(Glass has put a kerchief on his hair and is acting effeminate.)
Mrs. N.G.: Well, I would not say it was so wonderful.
M.T.: As I said, it was a perfect situation but then something
terrible happened. Mrs. Glass decided to leave me for Les Garner.
Mrs. N.G.: (sighs) I wanted a man, I wanted a real man.
M.T.: But, unfortunately for me, I had studied game theory
and was able to come up with the right solution for the situa-
tion which we see here drawn in the fifth of our charts. Now,
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Mrs. Glass, listen to me very carefully.
Mrs. N.G.: I'm listening, what do you want?
M.T.: You have two choices. You can return to me or you can
remain with that ridiculous Mr. Garner. Should you choose to
return to me, we will both live happily ever after and, as we
can see on Diagram 5, I will be most happy and you will be
happy enough. Should you decide not to return to me, then I
shall tell Norman Glass. He will be very unhappy with you,
he \vill tell my wife and she will be unhappy with me. Both of
us will be very unhappy as we see in the upper right-hand corner
and the upper left-hand corner of the chart.
Mrs. N.G.: Ah, that would not be very good, would it?
M.T.: No. So you see that, since I have made an irrevocable
threat, the game situation is reduced to only two boxes: the
lower left-hand corner where you can be happy enough by returning
to me; and the upper right-hand corner where, by not returning
to me, you must become very unhappy when Norman finds out what
you have done. So what is your choice?
Mrs. N.G.: Let me think about this a minute. Yes, I have a
better solution.
M.T.: What is that?
Mrs. N.G.: Listen to me very carefully. I have decided ab-
solutely, positively, definitely not to return to you.
M. T.: What?
-23-
Mrs. N.G.: Let me explain. You see, by my stating definitely
that I will not return to you, the game is reduced only to the
two boxes are on the right-hand side of the chart. Since I have
made my definite decision not to return to you, you have now
only the choice of whether or not you want to tell my husband.
If you tell my husband, your wife will find out and you will be
very unhappy. But, if you are wiser and do not tell Norman, then
I will be most happy and you will be unhappy. Therefore I am
certain that you will not tell Norman if I do not return to you.
M.T.: That is completely right.
Mrs. N.G.: I told you so.
M.T.: Except for one thing.
Mrs. N.G.: What is that?
M.T.: What you have forgotten is when I made my threat to you
all possibility of your not returning and my not telling Norman
of your foolishness was eliminated. The lower right-hand box
no longer existed as a possibility for the game. The only two
boxes left in the game as result of my threat were the lower
left-hand box and the upper right-hand box.
Mrs. N.G.: I think I see. Because you have made your definite
threat before I made my definite statement, I no longer had a
chance to make my definite statement.
M.T.: That is right. This is the essence of the threat situation:
he who makes the first firm threat or definite statement is the
winner. You never had a chance to threaten point-blank not to
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return to me because, by that time, I had already made my threat.
Because I had made my threat, you had only the choice to be very
unhappy or happy enough. Since you had only that choice, I now
ask you, Dear, which do you choose?
Mrs. N.G.: Ah, it is terrible, but I fear that I have no other
choice but to return to you.
M.T.: I can assure you that you'll never regret it.
Mrs. N.G.: I regret it already.
M.T.: But, after a year or two of this game, Norman and I tired
of the sport and took up boating.
(Norman removes female costume. Both players put on boating
hats.)
N.G.: In the course of our boating, we have learned that there
is a very large treasure--one million dollars--on a nearby is-
land. Each of us has the chance to take his boat to this
island and to carry away some of the treasure.
M.T.: I have a very large boat that can carry away all of the
treasure.
N.G.: My boat is much nicer but, alas, not so large and can carry
way only one-half of the treasure.
M.T.: The main problem for me is that every boat must be manned
by at least two people.
N.G.: So, it is necessary for us to get together--in technical
terms, to form a coalition--if we are to get any of the treasure
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at all. And we can see here in the rewards listed on Diagram 6
what the payoffs to various coalitions will be. If either of
us tries to go to get the treasure alone, the boat will sink and
he will come back with no treasure. Someone who does not have
a boat--Iet us call him Boatless--cannot possibly get the treasure.
If, however, we decide to get together, we can have a total re-
ward to be split between the two of us of one million dollars.
M.T.: Yes, and if I--my nickname is Largy--and Boatless get
together, we also can have reward of one million dollars as you
see here on the fifth line of our reward chart.
N.G.: And if I--my nickname is Smally--and Boatless get together,
we can have reward of 500,000 dollars. If the three of us get
together, then there will be a reward of 1 million dollars to be
split among the three of us.
M.T.: I think I understand the situation. Now, because you are
my friend, Smally, I would like to make the following proposition
to you. Listen very carefully.
N.G.: Yes, I am listening.
M.T.: We will go, you and I together, to get the treasure.
When we have brought it back safely, I shall give you 200,000
dollars.
N.G.: And I suppose you would keep 800,000 dollars.
M.T.: That is correct.
N.G.: I don't think this is a good idea.
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/'1_0.r;
""""'1-
#:'.-" ">
t· t ｾｾ
ｾ［ＺＢＧｊ
,.rｾ ｾ Ｎ ｾ Ｎ
€<:J;P-
o-
rr';'
ｾＺｾ
/"'\.
_.'01.-"ＧＱ［ＩＬ［Ｎｾ
'.l,_ I
I'),.
" +
,
Ｌｾ
('(\
ｾ Ｌ
../ )1·ｾ ｬ .:.. >. .. ,
!
ＨＨｾ
ｾ ｑＭＭＱＧＮ .J,Ｌ Ｑ ］ ｾ Ｚ , ,','. "" 't,\ ｟Ｌｾ .....
,
Diagram 6.
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M.T.: What do you mean?
N.G.: Let me explain. I can think of a far better arrangement.
Suppose, for instance, that I were to go on my boat; it is not
so big a boat as your ugly thing. I would go with Boatless to
the island. I would gladly give Boatless 50,000 dollars, and
I would get 450,000 dollars. Now that is better for Boatless
than the proposition that you made since he was not getting any
money under it and it is better for me since I will now get
450,000 dollars instead of the paltry 200,000 dollars that you
have offered me.
M.T.: It sounds like a weak idea to me.
N.G.: Well, fortunately for you, I have a much better solution
for both of us.
M.T.: What is that?
N.G.: I propose we go in your boat and then we will take back
the entire treasure and you will give me exactly one half of the
treasure, 500,000 dollars.
M.T.: That is ridiculous. Look at this. You are talking about
bringing Boatless into the picture. Look, what I could have done
for Boatless. I could have offered Boatless 100,000 dollars to
come with me in my boat. I would have gotten 900,000 dollars
and he would be much better off than under your suggestion of
giving him 50,000 dollars. I would be better off in getting
900,000 dollars than with the very generous offer which I made
to you of 200,000 dollars to come with me to get the treasure.
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But, since you are my friend, Smally, I will make a slightly
better offer for you. If you will come with me in my boat to
get the treasure, I shall be glad to give you 250,000 dollars
and, of course, keep 750,000 dollars for myself.
N.G.: Of course.
M.T.: Well, do you agree?
N.G.: I think so. If I want more than 250,000 dollars for myself
then the only way would be to offer less than 250,000 to Boatless.
But now, you can always make a more favorable counter offer to
Boatless, that is to offer him exactly 250,000 dollars, and keep
the 750,000 dollars for yourself. There is no way that I can improve
my situation by bringing boatless into the picture. I guess,
750,000 dollars and 250,000 dollars is a fair bargaining agreement.
M.T.: Surprisingly good. We had better stop here. Otherwise your
rapidly growing understanding of game theory will outstrip mine.
N.G.: And now, if there are no points on which we have not
succeeded in confusing our audience totally, we shall be pleased
to answer questions.
